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Abstract. Competitive information diffusion on large-scale social networks reveals
fundamental characteristics of rumor contagions and has profound influence on public
opinion formation. There has been growing interest in exploring dynamical mechanisms
of the competing evolutions recently. Nevertheless, the impacts of population
homophily, which determines powerful collective human behaviors, remains unclear.
In this paper, we incorporate homophily effects into a modified competitive ignorant-
spreader-ignorant (SIS) rumor diffusion model with generalized population preference.
Using microscopic Markov chain approach, we first derive the phase diagram of
competing diffusion results and examine how competitive information spreads and
evolves on social networks. We then explore the detailed effects of homophily, which
is modeled by a rewiring mechanism. Results show that homophily promotes the
formation of divided “echo chambers” and protects the disadvantaged information
from extinction, which further changes or even reverses the evolutionary advantage,
i.e., the difference of final proportions of the competitive information. We highlight
the conclusion that the reversals may happen only when the initially disadvantaged
information has stronger transmission ability, owning diffusion advantage over the
other one. Our framework provides profound insight into competing dynamics with
population homophily, which may pave ways for further controlling misinformation
and guiding public belief systems. Moreover, the reversing condition sheds light on
designing effective competing strategies in many real scenarios.
Keywords : competitive information diffusion, population homophily, dynamical
evolution, large-scale social networks
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21. Introduction
Owing to the rapid development of Internet technologies, the dynamical evolutions of
information diffusion on large-scale social networks have been widely concerned and
studied in recent years [1–10]. How to calculate the final scope of information delivery?
How to predict the threshold of information dissemination? What’s the coupled effects
of information diffusion and other evolution processes on multiple networks? Exploring
the underlying dynamical mechanisms of information diffusion is of vital significance
for understanding these important questions, which can further instruct powerful
applications in many different fields, such as controlling rumor spreading, promoting
innovations, designing efficient marketing strategies and etc [11–13].
Of particular interest, competitive information diffusion on social networks, which
reproduces the ubiquitous situations where individuals are exposed to multiple polarized
information related to the same social event, has attracted great attention recently [14–
16]. Understanding the diffusion patterns of competitive information helps to deal with
some great challenges nowadays. A direct application scenario is to understand the
simultaneous spreading of the truth and the rumors [17, 18]. This is of great significance
not only in physics, but also in economics and social science, considering the fact that
misinformation has been recorded as one of the main threats to human society by World
Economic Forum (WEF) [19]. Moreover, the final competing diffusion results have
profound influence on the formation of public opinions [20–25]. A typical example is
the US presidential election, where the outcome of competitive information diffusion on
large-scale social networks, like Facebook and Twitter, would directly affect the election
result [26, 27].
The competing dynamics was first studied on epidemic spreading where two
competitive diseases infect the same population [28–30]. Newman utilized the
generalized susceptible-infective-removed (SIR) model to describe the transmission of
two pathogens on networks [31]. Karrer et al. further studied the dynamics of competing
diseases with cross immunity and derived the theoretical phase diagram of the system
[32]. Leventhal et al. applied competitive susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model
to describe the evolution of infectious diseases and highlighted the significant role of
network heterogeneity [33].
Inspired by the idea that the dynamical process of information diffusion is analogous
to epidemic spreading to some extent, most literatures attempted to use epidemic-
like model to describe the competitive information diffusion [34–36]. Trpevski et
al. proposed competitive SIS model with stubbornness and completely asymmetry
preference, where the competing rumors satisfy cross immunity and individuals always
select rumor 1 when they are informed of two rumors simultaneously [37]. Furthermore,
some studies tried to incorporate the unique consumption patterns of information
diffusion compared to the disease spreading, which makes the model closer to reality.
Wang et al. proposed a theoretical framework that considered neighborhood influences
and found rich dynamics of two competing ideas [38].
3Despite the efforts and progress, it remains largely unknown how human behaviors,
especially those collective evolutions caused by the group psychology, influence the
competitive information diffusion. Previous studies have found that population
homophily, which means individuals prefer to seek for like-minded people while avoid
further communications with those who hold opposite opinions, is a widespread
characteristic of large-scale social networks [39–41]. In particular, homophily was verified
as the main psychological reason for the formation of echo chambers [42]. This indicates
that homophily is an essential factor of collective behaviors in competitive information
diffusion processes, which not only influences the efficiency of information spreading, but
also changes the potential diffusion paths, i.e., affects the underlying network topology.
However, there still lacks a proper understanding of the detailed impacts of homophily
on diffusion results of competitive information.
To fill this theoretical gap, in this paper, we propose a theoretical framework
which incorporates population homophily into a modified competitive SIS model with
generalized population preference [43]. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results
are provided to show how competitive information diffuses and evolves on social
networks. We find that homophily can significantly change and even reverse the
evolutionary advantage, i.e., the difference of final proportions of the two information.
However, the reversals only happen when the initially disadvantaged information has
stronger transmission ability but loses population preference. This indicates that to win
the competing evolutions, the best way for the information is to take the diffusion
advantage regardless of population preference. Our work reveals how population
homophily influences the diffusion processes and the evolutionary results of competitive
information, which provides profound insight into misinformation spreading as well as
public opinion formation on large-scale social networks.
2. Model description
Consider an undirected network with N nodes, whose adjacent matrix is denoted as
A = (aij)N×N . If there exists an edge between node i and node j, aij = 1. Otherwise,
aij = 0. We adopt ignorant-spreader-ignorant (SIS) rumor spreading model to describe
the diffusion process of a single piece of information, where ignorant (I) represents an
individual who has not known the information and spreaders (S) stand for the individuals
who are able to spread information to its neighbors, corresponding to the susceptible
and infected populations in classical epidemic model, respectively [44] . An important
characteristic of the SIS model is the reinfection mechanism, i.e. the recovered nodes
can be infected again, which could effectively describe the multi-round information
dissemination. In addition, the reinfection mechanism provides a simple and natural
way to characterize the viewpoint changing process in multiple information diffusion
circumstances.
In this work, we focus on the situation where two pieces of competitive information,
denoted as information 1 and information 2, spread simultaneously. Complying with
4previous studies, we assume that information 1 and information 2, such as the truth
and the rumors, are competitive with exclusiveness [45]. This means that all individuals
could only support one piece of information at any time. Thus, the population could be
divided into three classes according to their states: ignorant (I), spreader of information
1 (S1), spreader of information 2 (S2). The ignorant has not learned any information
or is confused about which information to support. S1 strongly supports information 1
and has a probability λ1 to spread information 1 to its ignorant neighbors. Meanwhile,
S1 forgets the information or becomes confused again because of the self-awareness
or the external social influence, i.e., the individual changes its state from S1 to I,
with probability µ1 [46]. Similarly, S2 transmits information 2 to its neighbors with
probability λ2 and becomes ignorant with probability µ2. In addition, we assume that
all individuals are stubborn once they make a choice, which means that the spreaders
of one information can not be persuaded by their neighbors to support the other one
directly [47].
It is worthy of note that there exists a special and important situation where
the ignorant is informed of two competitive information at the same time. Previous
works studied the scenario where information 1 always has a higher priority [37]. To
describe the population preference in a general way, here we denote a new parameter
α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) as the probability that the ignorant will choose to support and spread
information 1 when receives both information simultaneously.
Moreover, we incorporate rewiring mechanism into our model to describe the wide-
existing homophily on large-scale social networks, which is also well-known as “echo
chamber” phenomenon. At each time step, the links between S1 and S2 break with
probability p. Meanwhile, new links will generate from one of the broken links’ endpoints
to the randomly selected individuals who support the same information or in ignorant
states. In this way, we mimic the homophily behaviors that individuals tend to avoid
further communications with those who hold opposite opinions while prefer to seek for
those who support the same information. The rewiring probability p reflects the strength
of homophily among populations.
In summary, our model is composed of two dynamical processes: diffusion process
and rewiring process, as shown in figure 1:
(i) Diffusion process. At each time step, S1 and S2 transmit information to ignorant
neighbors with probability λ1 and λ2, respectively. Meanwhile, S1 and S2 become
ignorant again with probability µ1 and µ2. Specially, if an ignorant receives both
competitive information simultaneously, it chooses to become S1 with probability
α. Otherwise, with probability 1− α it becomes S2.
(ii) Rewiring process. At each time step, the links between S1 and S2 break with
probability p. Meanwhile, new links will generate, which connect one of the
endpoints of the broken links to the randomly chosen individuals who are ignorants
or spread the same information.
5Figure 1. Dynamical model of competitive information diffusion on social networks.
Nodes represent the individuals and edges represent the connections between them.
(a) Network structure and individuals’ states at time T . Ignorants, spreaders of
information 1 (S1) and spreaders of information 2 (S2) are represented by black, red
and blue nodes, respectively. (a)(b) Diffusion process. S1 spreads information 1 to
its neighbors along red edges while S2 diffuses information 2 along blue edges. If an
ignorant individual receives both information simultaneously, he/she will choose to
support information 1 with probability α. Meanwhile, spreaders have a probability
of becoming ignorants again. (a)(c) Rewiring process. The link between S1 and S2
breaks with probability p and a new link will generate from one of the spreaders to a
randomly chosen individual who is ignorant or support the same information, as shown
by the yellow edges. (d) Network structure and individuals’ states at time T + 1. It is
composed of the nodes’ state in (b) and the network structure in (c).
3. Theoretical framework
3.1. Modified competitive SIS model with population preference
We first explore how the modified competitive SIS model without homophily behaves
on networks. Let q˜i
S1(t) denotes the probability that node i changes its state from I to
S1 at time t. Based on the description of diffusion process in Section 2, q˜i
S1(t) can be
written as
q˜i
S1(t) = (1− qS1i (t))qS2i (t) + α(1− qS1i (t))(1− qS2i (t)), (1)
where qS1i (t) and q
S2
i (t) indicate the probabilities that node i is not informed of
information 1, not informed of information 2 if i is an ignorant at time t, respectively.
Thus, the first term of equation (1) represents the probability that node i is informed
of information 1 but not informed of information 2, while the second term expresses
the probability that node i receives both information concurrently and choose to spread
information 1.
Let pXi (t) denotes the probability that node i is in X state at time t, X ∈ {I, S1, S2}.
6Clearly, pXi (t) satisfies p
I
i (t) + p
S1
i (t) + p
S2
i (t) = 1. Then we have
qS1i (t) =
∏
i 6=j
(1− λ1aijpS1j (t))
qS2i (t) =
∏
i 6=j
(1− λ2aijpS2j (t)).
(2)
Similarly, the probability that node i in ignorant state becomes a spreader of
information 2 at time t, denoted as q˜i
S2(t), is
q˜i
S2(t) = qS1i (t)(1− qS2i (t)) + (1− α)(1− qS1i (t))(1− qS2i (t)). (3)
Therefore, the evolutionary equations of the competitive SIS model with population
preference can be derived by microscopic Markov chain approach, which read as
pIi (t+ 1) = p
I
i (t)q
S1
i (t)q
S2
i (t) + p
S1
i (t)µ1
+ pS2i (t)µ2
pS1i (t+ 1) = p
I
i (t)q˜i
S1(t) + pS1i (t)(1− µ1)
pS2i (t+ 1) = p
I
i (t)q˜i
S2(t) + pS2i (t)(1− µ2).
(4)
3.2. Competitive information diffusion with homophily
We then examine the dynamics of competitive information diffusion with homophily,
described by the rewiring process in our model. Note that under this condition, the
structure of underlying network evolves over time and is dependent on the current
distribution of the population states. On the other hand, the diffusion process also
relies on the changing topology of the network. Therefore, we have to consider the
coupled evolutions of the nodes’ states and the network structure. Denote ft(A,x) as
the probability distribution that A(t) = A and x(t) = x in the dynamical system. Here
A(t) = (aij(t))N×N is the adjacent matrix and x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), ......, xN(t)) is the
state vector of all nodes at time t. xi(t) = 0, 1, 2 represents that node i is in state I, S1
and S2 at time t, respectively.
In this section, we give mathematical description of evolution process from time
t to t + 1, i.e. calculating ft+1(B,y) for any possible A(t + 1) = B = (bij)N×N and
x(t+ 1) = y = (y1, y2, ......, yN).
Firstly, given a certain system state A(t) = A and x(t) = x at time t. The
probability that ignorant node i is not informed of information 1 or information 2 can
be written as
qS1i (t) =
∏
i 6=j
(1− λ1aij(t)δ(xj(t)− 1))
qS2i (t) =
∏
i 6=j
(1− λ2aij(t)δ(xj(t)− 2)),
(5)
where δ(x) = 1 if x = 0 and δ(x) = 0 if x 6= 0. Then we can derive the probabilities that
node i changes its state from I to S1 and S2, i.e., q˜i
S1(t) and q˜i
S2(t), by substituting
7equation (5) into equations (1) and (3). Thus, the evolutionary equations of population
states read
pIi (t+ 1) = δ(xi(t))q
S1
i (t)q
S2
i (t) + δ(xi(t)− 1)µ1
+ δ(xi(t)− 2)µ2
pS1i (t+ 1) = δ(xi(t))q˜i
S1(t) + δ(xi(t)− 1)(1− µ1)
pS2i (t+ 1) = δ(xi(t))q˜i
S2(t) + δ(xi(t)− 2)(1− µ2).
(6)
Further, the conditional probability that node i is in state yi at time t + 1, which
is denotes as pyi , can be written as
pyi = δ(yi)p
I
i (t+ 1) + δ(yi − 1)pS1i (t+ 1) + δ(yi − 2)pS2i (t+ 1). (7)
Therefore, the probability that nodes’ states evolve from x to y is
px→y =
N∏
i=1
pyi . (8)
Let pA→B denote the probability that network structure evolves from A to B. The
number of links between S1 and S2 at time t is
L =
1
2
∑
(i,j)
δ(xi(t)xj(t)aij(t)− 2). (9)
At time t+ 1, the number of remaining S1S2 links which is not broken at time t is
L∗ =
1
2
∑
(i,j)
δ(xi(t)xj(t)bij − 2). (10)
According to the rewiring mechanism defined in Section 2, we have
pA→B = (1− p)L∗
[
p
2(I(t) + S1(t))
]l1 [ p
2(I(t) + S2(t))
]L−L∗−l1
, (11)
where l1 =
1
2
∑
(i,j)
φ(bij − aij(t)) for all (i, j) that satisfies {(i, j)|xi(t) = 1 or xj(t) = 1},
and φ(x) = 1 if x = 1, otherwise φ(x) = 0. Here l1 calculates the number of new
links rewiring from the S1 endpoints, i.e. new S1S1 and S1I links at time t. Hence, the
first formula (1 − p)L∗ is the conditional probability that there are L∗ remaining S1S2
links at time t, and the second formula [p/(2I(t) + 2S1(t))]
l1 ∗[p/(2I(t) + 2S2(t))]L−L
∗−l1
represents the conditional probability that the other L − L∗ broken S1S2 links rewire,
among which l1 new links rewire from the S1 endpoints. Note that the second formula
here is actually an approximation which does not take the multiple edges or loops into
consideration, since the real social networks are large and sparse.
Finally, note that the evolution probabilities of nodes’ states and network structure
from time t to t + 1 are independent. Therefore, summing up all the possible system
8states at time t, the coupled probability distribution ft+1(B,y) at time t + 1 can be
calculated by
ft+1(B,y)
=
∑
(A,x)
ft(A,x) ∗ px→y ∗ pA→B
=
∑
(A,x)
ft(A,x) ∗
N∏
i=1
pyi ∗ (1− p)L∗ ∗
[
p
2(I(t) + S1(t))
]l1 [ p
2(I(t) + S2(t))
]L−L∗−l1
.
(12)
4. Results
We start from the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random graphs with N = 1000 nodes. The average
degree is 〈k〉 = 10 and initially ten S1 and ten S2 are randomly selected. To eliminate
the fluctuation, the numerical simulation results in the rest of the paper is the average of
100 times. The stable states of the dynamical system is approximated by the simulations
running for 500 steps. Additionally, for simplicity and without loss of generality, we set
µ1 = µ2 = µ.
4.1. The effects of diffusion advantage and population preference
Firstly, we study how diffusion advantage and population preference affect the competing
diffusion results. Here the diffusion advantage refers to the difference between
transmission probabilities of the competitive information. We set p = 0 which excludes
the influence of homophily.
In figure 2(a), we present the effect of diffusion advantage. To eliminate the
influence of population preference, α is set to be 0.5. We fix λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2 and
change λ1 from 0 to 1. Results show that the competing results experience three stages
as λ1 increases. Initially when λ1 ≤ 0.16, S1 becomes extinct in the competition. When
0.16 < λ1 < 0.3, the proportion of S1 increases sharply and S1, S2 coexist. Finally when
λ1 ≥ 0.3, only S1 survives. Figure 2(b) shows detailed time evolutions of competing
results when information 1 has the diffusion advantage and S1, S2 coexist. In figure 2(c),
we provide the impact of population preference. We fix λ1 = λ2 = 0.2 and change α from
0 to 1. Similarly, S1 first vanishes, then rises rapidly, and dominants the population in
the end as α increases. A typical example for the time evolutions of competing results
when population preference exists is shown in figure 2(d). Note that in all subfigures,
our theoretical predictions provided by numerical solutions of equations (1)- (4) agree
well with the simulation results, as shown by dash lines.
Furthermore, in figure 3, we explore the nonlinear joint effects of population
preference and diffusion advantage. The phase plane is divided into four regions: (a)
only S1 survives, (b) S1 and S2 coexist: S1 > S2, (c) S1 and S2 coexist: S1 < S2, (d)
only S2 survives. All separatrix lines are calculated numerically by equations (1)- (4). It
is noteworthy that when λ1 < λ2 = 0.2, i.e., information 2 has the diffusion advantage,
9Figure 2. The effects of diffusion advantage and population preference on competing
diffusion results. Theoretical predictions provided by numerical solutions of equations
(1)- (4) are shown by dash lines. Note that the rewiring probability p is set to be 0,
which excludes the influence of homophily. (a) How the diffusion advantage, i.e. the
difference between transmission probability, affects competitive information diffusion.
We fix λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2, α = 0.5 and change λ1 from 0 to 1. (b) Time evolutions
of competing results when diffusion advantage exists. The parameters are as follows:
λ1 = 0.25, λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2, α = 0.5. (c) The impact of population preference. We
set λ1 = λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2. The competing results are presented as a function of α.
(d) Time evolutions of competing results when population preference exists. We set
λ1 = λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2, α = 0.45.
the competing results are possible to change from region (d) where only S2 survives to
region (a) where only S1 survives as α varies from 0 to 1. This indicates the great power
that the newly discussed population preference has on competing diffusion results. On
the other hand, when α > 0.5, i.e., information 1 has the population preference, the
competing diffusion results are also possible to cross the four regions as λ1 increases
from 0 to 1.
4.2. The effects of homophily
In this section, we explore the detailed effects of homophily on competing diffusion
results. We mainly focus on the following problems: How homophily influences diffusion
advantage as well as population preference? In particular, can homophily reverse the
evolutionary advantage, i.e., completely change the final competing diffusion results
when other influencing factors are settled? Specifically, on what conditions the reversing
10
Figure 3. Phase diagram for competing diffusion results under different values of
population preference and diffusion advantage. We fix λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2. The phase
plane is divided into four parts, represented by region (a)-(d), respectively: only S1
survives, S1 and S2 coexist: S1>S2, S1 and S2 coexist: S1<S2, only S2 survives. The
separatrix lines are calculated numerically by equations (1)- (4).
Figure 4. How homophily affects network structure over time. Spreader of
information 1 (S1), spreader of information 2 (S2) and ignorant are shown by red, blue
and grey nodes, respectively. The parameters are set as follows: λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.15,
µ = 0.1, α = 0, p = 1, N = 103. (a) T = 0: S1 = 10, S2 = 10. (b) T = 5: S1 = 490,
S2 = 284. (c) T = 15: S1 = 520, S2 = 368.
phenomenon may happen?
In figure 4, we show how network structure evolves when population homophily
exists. The rewiring probability p is set to be 1. We find that the individuals gradually
get close to those who spread the same information while leave away from those who
support the different information as time goes on. At T = 15, the whole network is
completely divided into two clusters. Within each cluster, only one of the information
survives, forming the echo chamber phenomenon which is widespread on social networks.
Therefore, the population homophily can significantly affect the network structure and
give rise to the formation of echo chambers, which will further influence the information
diffusion paths and change the competing results.
We then study how homophily affects diffusion advantage in figure 5. We fix
11
Figure 5. How homophily affects diffusion advantage in competing diffusion process.
We fix α = 0.5, λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2. (a) The evolutionary advantage, i.e. the final
proportion of S1 − S2, under different combinations of λ1 and rewiring probability p.
(b) A detailed view of (a) where λ1 changes from 0.2 to 0.6. (c) The final proportion
of S2 under different combinations of λ1 and rewiring probability p. (d) A detailed
view of (c) where λ1 varies from 0.2 to 0.6. (e)(f) How homophily affects the effects of
diffusion advantage. The final proportion of S1 and S2 are presented as a function of
rewiring probability. We set λ1 = 0.225 in (e) and λ1 = 0.3 in (f), respectively.
α = 0.5 to exclude the influence of population preference. In figure 5(a), the evolutionary
advantage, i.e. the final proportion of S1−S2, is presented under different combinations
of λ1 and rewiring probability p. Results show that the population homophily can
change the evolutionary advantage arisen by diffusion advantage to some extent. When
λ1 is slightly larger than λ2, which is equal to 0.2 in our simulations, the evolutionary
advantage first increases and then decreases as the rewiring probability grows. When
λ1 is much larger than λ2, the evolutionary advantage reduces as p increases. Figure
5(b) provides a detailed view of figure 5(a), where λ1 varies from 0.2 to 0.6. We find the
proportion of S1−S2 is always larger than zero. This indicates that without population
preference, the population homophily could not reverse the evolutionary advantage
caused by diffusion advantage. In figure 5(c) and (d), we show the global and local
phase diagram of the proportion of S2. As p becomes larger, the critical value of λ1
which makes S2 extinct exhibits a slow decrease and then a rapid increase, indicating the
fact that higher population homophily helps the information with lower transmission
probability survive in the competition while lower homophily accelerates its extinction
process. In figure 5(e) and (f), we give two detailed examples of how homophily affects
the effects of diffusion advantage. The proportion of S1 and S2 are presented as a
function of rewiring probability. We set λ1 = 0.225, 0.3, respectively. To sum up, low
homophily enhances diffusion advantage in competitive information diffusion while high
homophily reduces it.
12
Figure 6. How homophily affects population preference in competitive information
diffusion. We fix λ1 = λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2. (a) The evolutionary advantage, i.e. the
final proportion of S1 − S2, under different combinations of population preference α
and rewiring probability p. (b) The proportion of S2 under different combinations
of population preference α and rewiring probability p. (c)(d) How homophily affects
the effect of population preference. The proportion of S1 and S2 are presented as a
function of rewiring probability. We set α = 0.55, 0.7, respectively.
Next, we discuss the impact of homophily on population preference in figure 6. We
set λ1 = λ2 = 0.2 to exclude the effects of diffusion advantage. Due to the symmetry,
we assume α ∈ [0.5, 1]. In figure 6(a), we present the evolutionary advantage under
different combinations of population preference α and rewiring probability p. When
α is slightly larger than 0.5, the evolutionary advantage first rises and then declines
as p becomes larger. When α is much larger than 0.5, the evolutionary advantage
reduces as p increases. While the homophily does change the evolutionary advantage,
the proportion of S1 − S2 is always larger than zero. This indicates that without the
existence of diffusion advantage, the evolutionary advantage solely caused by population
preference can not be reversed by homophily effects. Figure 6(b) further presents the
phase diagram for the proportion of S2. The critical value of α which results in the
extinction of S2 displays a gradual decrease followed by a sharp increase as the rewiring
probability grows, which reveals that lower homophily accelerates the extinction of
information with lower population preference while higher homophily helps it survive
from the competition. In figure 6(c) and (d), two typical examples of how homophily
affects the effect of population preference are given. We set α = 0.55, 0.7, respectively.
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Results verify that lower homophily promotes population preference effects while higher
homophily suppresses it.
Through observing the significant variations of evolutionary advantage, we have
examined the detailed effects of homophily on diffusion advantage and population
preference, respectively. For a better understanding of the simulation results, here
we provide further explanations based on the dynamical model mechanisms. In
general, the population homophily, which is modeled as the rewiring process, plays
two main roles in competitive information diffusion processes. One is to advance people
to avoid ineffective communications with opposite-minded individuals and to diffuse
their information to ignorants or like-minded agents, which improves the efficiency of
information diffusion and thus enhances the evolutionary advantage. The other one is to
form clusters of like-minded individuals, which separates the competing information into
different communities and hence protects the information in disadvantage. Basically, the
competing diffusion result is the balance of these two impacts of population homophily.
When p is small, the clustering speed is relatively slow compared to the information
diffusion. In this situation, the role of improving the efficiency of communication
dominates, which promotes the evolutionary advantage. On the other hand, when p
is large, the role of clustering takes the domination which facilitates the formation of
two echo chambers like in figure 4, helping the disadvantaged information survives.
Under this circumstance, the evolutionary advantage is reduced. However, for now, the
evolutionary advantage can not be reversed by homophily when it is caused by a single
competing factor, regardless of diffusion advantage or population preference. Naturally,
we then raise an interesting question which leads to more complicated situations: if
the evolutionary advantage emerges under the circumstances where the initial winning
information owns population preference but has no diffusion advantage, or it takes
diffusion advantage but loses population preference, can population homophily reverse
the competing diffusion results?
In view of this question, in figure 7, we further explore the reversing conditions in
competitive information diffusion. First, in figure 7(a)-(c), we examine the situation
where information 1 takes diffusion advantage while loses population preference. We
fix λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2, α = 0.3 and change λ1 from 0.2 to 1. Figure 7(a) shows that
homophily can reverse the competing diffusion results, i.e., make S1 − S2 change from
negative to positive for a range of λ1: λ1 ∈ [0.227, 0.33]. To give a clear sight of this
reversing phenomenon, in figure 7(b) and (c), we show the variations of S1 and S2
as a function of rewiring probability p in two detailed examples, where λ1 = 0.25, 0.3
respectively. Results show that as p increases, information 1 goes through losing to
winning, becoming stablely advantaged when p is large. Then in figure 7(d)-(f), we
study the circumstance where information 1 owns population preference but has no
diffusion advantage. In figure 7(d), when α > 0.745, S1 − S2 > 0 initially which
corresponds to the reversing situation discussed in figure 7(a)-(c). Therefore here we
focus on α < 0.745 in which situation the initially winning information (information
2) has diffusion advantage but loses population preference. Results show that the
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Figure 7. Homophily reverses the evolutionary advantage in competitive information
diffusion on certain conditions. (a)-(c) The circumstance where information 1 takes
diffusion advantage while loses population preference. We set λ2 = 0.2, µ = 0.2,
α = 0.3. (a) The evolutionary advantage, i.e. the final proportion of S1 − S2,
under different combinations of λ1 and rewiring probability p. (b)(c) Two detailed
reversing examples. We present the proportions of S1 and S2 as a function of rewiring
probability. λ1 = 0.25, 0.3, respectively. (d)-(f) The circumstance where information 1
owns population preference but has no diffusion advantage. We fix λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.4,
µ = 0.2. (d) The evolutionary advantage under different combinations of population
preference α and rewiring probability p. (e)(f) The proportions of S1 and S2 as a
function of rewiring probability. α = 0.745, 0.7, respectively.
reversing phenomenon does not happen any more and information 2 always wins as
p increases. Two typical examples are shown in figure 7(e) and (f), where α = 0.745
and 0.7, respectively. More parameter combinations are verified in Appendix A for
this circumstance and no reversals are found. To sum up, population homophily is
possible to reverse the evolutionary advantage in competitive information diffusion, but
only if the initial winning information owns population preference but has no diffusion
advantage. In other words, the only chance for the disadvantaged information to win
is to occupy the diffusion advantage on large-scale social networks, regardless of the
population preference.
5. Conclusions and Discussions
Competitive information diffusion is ubiquitous on online social networks, which directly
influences the formation of public beliefs. For a better understanding of many real-world
challenges such as rumor contagions and political social polarization, great effects have
been made in exploring the underlying dynamical mechanisms for competing diffusion
processes in recent years[48]. However, there still lacks a proper understanding of how
population homophily, which is regarded as one of the most important collective human
15
behaviors on large-scale social networks, affects the diffusion results of competitive
information [49].
In this work, we propose a modified competitive SIS model, which incorporates
homophily and generalized population preference to describe the simultaneous spread
of two pieces of competitive information on large-scale social networks. Firstly, we
examine how the modified model behaves without homophily. Using microscopic
Markov Chain approach, we derive the phase diagram of competing diffusion results
to show the impacts of diffusion advantage (i.e., the difference of transmission abilities
of competitive information) and population preference. Then we explore the detailed
effects of homophily, which is characterized by a rewiring mechanism. When population
homophily is strong, the network structure evolves over time and finally forms two
divided clusters, i.e., echo chambers, within which only one of the information survives.
Results show that homophily can significantly change the evolutionary advantage. Lower
homophily accelerates the extinction of disadvantaged information which enhances the
evolutionary advantage, while higher homophily helps the disadvantaged information
survive from the competition which reduces the evolutionary advantage. Further, we
highlight the conclusion that homophily can even reverse the evolutionary advantage,
but only when the initially disadvantaged information takes diffusion advantage while
loses population preference. This indicates that the best chance for the information
to win the competing evolution, either to secure the advantage or to reverse the
disadvantage, is to occupy the diffusion advantage regardless of population preference.
Our work shows how population homophily makes influence on competitive
information diffusion, which provides important insight into misinformation spreading,
public opinion formation and many other competing dynamical processes on social
networks. Moreover, the reversing condition based on the theoretical framework sheds
light on designing effective competing strategies in a series of real situations, such as
spreading new ideas, promoting industrial products and doing marketing. Our model
also paves ways for further empirical studies in related scenarios.
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Appendix A. complementary studies for reversing conditions
In figure A1, we explore different parameter combinations to check whether reversals
may happen under the circumstance that the initial winning information takes diffusion
advantage but has no population preference. In figure A1(a) and (b), we fix µ = 0.2
and study the situations where the difference between transmission probabilities of the
competitive information (i.e., λ2 − λ1) is small, which are necessary complements for
the results in figure 7(d). Furthermore, in figure A1(c), we change µ to 0.1 to check the
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Figure A1. Exploring whether homophily can reverse the competing diffusion
results when the initial winning information takes diffusion advantage but has no
population preference. We present phase graphs of evolutionary advantage under
different parameter combinations: (a) µ = 0.2, λ1 = 0.36, λ2 = 0.4; (b) µ = 0.2,
λ1 = 0.19, λ2 = 0.2; (c) µ = 0.1, λ1 = 0.19, λ2 = 0.2.
influence of recovery rate in competing diffusion processes. Results show that no reversal
happens when the initial winning information takes diffusion advantage, regardless of
the population preference.
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